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Forgetting human rights – the Brexit debate 
Adrienne Yong
*
 
 
Abstract 
This article considers the implications of the UK’s vote to leave the European Union in relation to the 
fundamental rights of EU citizens. The possible consequences for individual rights protection are 
examined in light of UK Prime Minister Theresa May’s decision to formally trigger art.50 TEU, the 
government’s paper on ‘Safeguarding the Position of EU Citizens Living in the UK and UK Nationals 
Living in the EU’ and the recently published European Union (Withdrawal) Bill. This article intends 
to highlight an issue that has seemingly been set aside amidst the chaotic developments related to 
Brexit – the protection of fundamental human rights. The article’s central argument is twofold. 
Firstly, the article contends that the UK Government currently risks potentially breaching several 
substantive provisions contained within the European Convention on Human Rights because a 
satisfactory regime of rights protection for EU citizens living in the UK, or British citizens in other 
EU Member States, has not yet been clearly established. Secondly, the plan to exclude the EU Charter 
of Fundamental Rights must be seriously reconsidered. The Charter currently provides the strongest 
level of protection for certain human rights in Europe, and it is argued that it cannot be so easily 
sacrificed. The UK, irrespective of Brexit, must be serious about its commitment to the protection of 
human rights. 
                                                          
*
 Lecturer in Law at the City Law School, City, University of London. Many thanks to Henry Pearce, the 
participants and attendees of the panel this paper was presented at the CES 2017 in Glasgow and the EHRLR 
Editorial Board for their patience with this article’s various versions. All views and errors are my own. 
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1 Introduction 
The result of UK’s referendum of 23 June 2016 on the EU in favour of leaving the EU can be 
reasonably described a surprising one,
1
 especially given that there was no precedent for any Member 
State withdrawing from the EU. Article 50 TEU, the EU’s official withdrawal provision, was formally 
triggered by UK Prime Minister Theresa May, nine months after the referendum.
2
 The UK Parliament 
approved art.50 TEU being triggered through the European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Act 
2017.
3
 The year immediately following the referendum has been a tumultuous one, politically. After 
formally notifying the EU of its intention to withdraw in March 2017, the (then majority 
Conservative) UK Government published a White Paper entitled ‘Legislating for the United 
Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union’.4 However, following the snap election in June 
2017 in which the Conservative government lost its majority, the plans for Brexit are no longer as 
clear as the original White Paper suggests. There is an offer for the protection of EU citizens living in 
the UK and British nationals in the EU,
5
 and the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill sets out the plans 
for incorporating EU law into UK law after Brexit has been published.
6
 This article will examine 
these developments, but will argue that a particularly significant issue has been cast aside amidst the 
complicated process of withdrawal – the protection of human rights. 
 
The article contends that undermining the protection of human rights in this context gives rise to two 
notable points of discussion. Firstly, there are various provisions contained within the European 
Convention on Human Rights (hereafter the ECHR or the Convention) that would risk being breached 
                                                          
1
 Until today, the UK Government has been criticised for seeming unprepared. See Alex Barker, ‘Britain yet to 
face facts on Brexit, EU’s Barnier warns’ (July 6, 2017) Financial Times, 
https://www.ft.com/content/8404d08a-6221-11e7-91a7-502f7ee26895 [accessed 12 August, 2017].  
2
 Article 50 of the Treaty on the European Union; ‘Brexit: MPs overwhelmingly back Article 50 bill’ (Feb 1, 
2017) BBC News, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-38833883 [accessed 1 Feb 2017]; ‘Key points from 
the Article 50 letter’ (March 29, 2017) BBC News, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-uk-leaves-the-eu-
39433403 [accessed March 29, 2017]. 
3
 See R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2016] EWHC 2768. 
4
 Department for Exiting the European Union, Legislating for the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the 
European Union (White Paper, Cm 9976, 2017). 
5
 HM Government, The United Kingdom’s Exit from the European Union: Safeguarding the Position of EU 
Citizens Living in the UK and UK Nationals Living in the EU (White Paper, Cm 9464, 2017). 
6
 European Union (Withdrawal) HC Bill (2017-19) [1]. 
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by an inadequate system of protection guaranteeing EU citizens’ residency rights after Brexit. In the 
first section, the focus will be on art.8 ECHR (the right to private and family life) and art.14 ECHR 
(the right to non-discrimination), and the role of Protocol 12 (general prohibition on discrimination).
7
 
Secondly, the EU (Withdrawal) Bill proclaims “[t]he Charter of Fundamental Rights is not part of 
domestic law on or after exit day.”8 However, this article will argue against this, and argue strongly in 
support of retaining the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (hereafter referred to as ‘the 
Charter’). It seems that the UK Government has refused to acknowledge and give effect to the 
significant value of the Charter.
9
 Though many of its constituent rights are already guaranteed by the 
common law, other Acts of the UK Parliament and international standards,
10
 the Charter’s substantive 
provisions should be retained to ensure the highest level of rights protection possible. In the second 
section, the focus will be on data protection, rights to non-discrimination based on sexual orientation, 
rights to conduct a business and property rights. Based on the findings that both systems of rights 
protection contribute significantly to the overall regime of individual rights protection enjoyed by EU 
citizens and UK nationals alike, the article ultimately concludes that for the UK Government to 
undermine human rights protection under the ECHR and to refuse to incorporate the Charter into 
national law would be unwise and undesirable.  
 
2 Implications under the ECHR 
The relationship between the EU and the ECHR has been complicated from the outset.
11
 However, as 
rights enjoyed by British nationals via the ECHR should remain unaffected by Brexit,
12
 what is now 
in need of clarification are questions relating to whether, when, and how the act of leaving the EU will 
                                                          
7
 Protocol 12 to the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms on the Prohibition of 
Discrimination 2000. 
8
  European Union (Withdrawal) Bill cl 5(4). 
9
 The original “Great Repeal Bill” White Paper also suggested the Charter would be scrapped in its entirety. See 
also Jonathan Cooper, ‘We need to keep the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights’ (July 19, 2017) The Times 
Brief https://www.thetimesbrief.co.uk/users/39175-the-brief-team/posts/18639-we-need-to-keep-the-eu-charter-
of-fundamental-rights [accessed July 22, 2017]. 
10
 Human Rights Act 1998; Equality Act 2010; European Social Charter (Revised) 1996. 
11
 Opinion 2/94 [1996] ECR I-1759. The Opinion is a prelude, supposedly, to accession to the ECHR in Article 
6 TEU. 
12
 Great Repeal Bill White Paper, para 2.22. 
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engage any ECHR rights. The EU has considered the rulings of the European Court of Human Rights 
as being of “special significance”,13 meaning that the Court of Justice of the EU (hereafter the CJEU 
or the Court) is not bound by the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, but can and 
occasionally does draw inspiration from them. Adjudication in the European Court of Human Rights 
is undertaken through a purely rights-based lens and, as Gaja notes, the ECHR imposes positive 
obligations on its Member States regarding the protection of rights contained within the ECHR.
14
 The 
European Court of Human Rights has a longer history of developing the protection of human rights in 
Europe than the CJEU.
15
 Because the ECHR will remain binding on the UK after it exits the EU, it is 
likely that the obligations imposed on the UK by arts 8 and 14 ECHR will become particularly 
relevant in relation to the status of EU citizens currently residing in the UK. This section outlines how 
the ECHR will constitute an important source of rights protection for various individuals who may 
have their rights infringed as a direct consequence of Brexit. 
 
The consequences for certain individuals if the UK does not guarantee their rights post-Brexit in a 
comprehensive and adequate fashion may be severe. In particular, under the current proposals, family 
members of EU citizens will have to meet far more stringent standards in order to be allowed a right 
to remain with the EU citizen.
16
 Though recognising that the process of keeping a family together has 
not been particularly straightforward of late under EU law,
17
 to require further process and procedure 
would be unduly burdensome, not least because of the risk of the EU citizen being separated from any 
non-EU family members. Furthermore, the lack of information regarding the “cut-off date” for entry 
to the UK to be subject to the pre-Brexit regime leaves individuals in a highly precarious situation, 
and risks interfering with their private lives. Finally, the most troubling issue concerning of the 
                                                          
13
 Opinion 2/94 at [33]. 
14
 Giorgio Gaja, ‘Accession to the ECHR’ in Andrea Biondi, Piet Eeckhout and Stefanie Ripley (eds), EU Law 
After Lisbon (OUP: Oxford 2012), 184. 
15
 Cf. noting as well that there are very few sanctions available for contracting States who breach ECHR 
obligations.  
16
 Colin Yeo, ‘Analysis: what is the UK proposing for EU citizens in the UK and EU citizens in the EU?’ (June 
27, 2017) Free Movement https://www.freemovement.org.uk/analysis-what-is-the-uk-proposing-for-eu-citizens-
in-the-uk-and-eu-citizens-in-the-eu/ [accessed June 27, 2017]. 
17
 Eleanor Spaventa, ‘Family Rights for Circular Migrants and Frontier Workers: O and B, and S and G’ (2015) 
52 CMLR 753. 
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proposals for EU citizens is the UK’s rejection of the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the EU.18 
If this proposal becomes reality, then the ECHR and the European Court of Human Rights will play 
an even more significant role in protecting EU citizens after Brexit. 
 
Article 8 is the most relevant provision of the ECHR that could offer protection to affected individuals 
after Brexit. There are several pre-requisites for determining whether there has been a breach of art.8 
ECHR. The first is to determine whether there is private or family life established. Once this has been 
done, European Court of Human Rights case law has established that certain actions, such as 
separating parent and child, will be considered an interference with art.8 ECHR.
19
 It is important to 
recognise this approach of the European Court is in stark contrast to the scope of private and family 
life before the CJEU. This has become especially obvious in recent cases on citizenship.
20
 The CJEU 
has excluded human rights considerations entirely from its judgments of late,
21
 and this approach has 
been widely criticised.
22
 For this reason, there is an understanding that there is a narrower 
interpretation of art.8 ECHR before the CJEU than before the European Court of Human Rights.
23
 
The argument here, therefore, is that a claim brought before the European Court of Human Rights 
concerning art.8 ECHR has more chance of being interpreted broadly than if it was brought before the 
CJEU. Individuals affected by Brexit should rather turn to the Court of Human Rights for protection. 
 
This claim can be supported by way of reference to ECHR case law. The European Court of Human 
Rights, for instance, has confirmed that the notion of private life as per art.8 ECHR includes the 
                                                          
18
 Citizens’ Rights White Paper, para 58. 
19
 Sahin v Germany (App. No. 30943/96), judgment of 8 July 2003.  
20
 See for example, O and B; S and G (C-456/12 and C-457/12) March 12, 2014; Dano (C-333/13) November 
11, 2014; McCarthy and Others (C-202/13) December 18, 2014; Alimanovic (C-67/14), September 15, 2015; 
Garcia-Nieto (C-299/13) February 25, 2016. 
21
 Cases after Dano (C-333/13) and Alimanovic (C-67/14) are particularly relevant recent examples. 
22
 See Daniel Thym, ‘When Union citizens turn into illegal migrants: the Dano Case’ [2015] ELR 249; Herwig 
Verschueren, ‘Preventing “Benefit Tourism” in the EU: a Narrow or Broad Interpretation of the Possibilities 
Offered by the ECJ in Dano?’ (2015) 52 CMLR 363; Spaventa, ‘Family Rights for Circular Migrants and 
Frontier Workers: O and B, and S and G’. 
23
 Article 8 ECHR has been decisive in other citizenship case law, but simply not explicit. See Zhu and Chen 
(C-200/02) [2004] ECR I-9925; Carpenter (C-60/00) [2001] ECR I-6279 cf. Zambrano (C-34/09) [2011] ECR 
I-1177. 
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“totality of social ties between settled migrants and the community in which they are living”.24 
Establishing a ‘private life’ or ‘family life’ involves a holistic contextual consideration of an 
individual’s personal circumstances, and applying this wide interpretation broadens the number of 
situations that fall within the scope of the art.8 ECHR’s protection. The right to a private and family 
life, however, would still be subject to interference under art.8(2) ECHR.
25
 Nevertheless, such 
interferences would undergo a proportionality assessment, and arguably, excessive interference could 
still be curbed by a thorough proportionality assessment, especially considering the number of 
potentially affected individuals.
26
 Because of its wide scope of protection, art.8 ECHR is the most 
appropriate right to claim protection from for those affected by Brexit. 
 
Another provision contained within the ECHR which may be potentially relevant to individuals post-
Brexit is art.14 ECHR, the right to non-discrimination. The scope of art.14 ECHR has been placed 
under scrutiny due to the way in which it is only ever invoked alongside other rights contained within 
the Convention.
27
 Gerards argues that “[t]o provide for a high level of protection against 
discrimination, the European Court of Human Rights would need to bring the protection offered by 
Article 14 in line with the sophisticated case law of the CJEU.”28 This reflects the fact that the level of 
protection for non-discrimination under the EU Treaties and its related legal instruments has been 
more effective than the provisions in the Convention as applied by the European Court of Human 
Rights. In the jurisprudence of the CJEU on citizenship, for instance, the principle of non-
discrimination has been interpreted as almost being an integral aspect of the rights to citizenship.
29
 If, 
therefore, the European Court of Human Rights were to also interpret the right to non-discrimination 
as a necessary consideration when evaluating any potential breaches of art.8 ECHR, then this would 
                                                          
24
 Üner v Netherlands (2007) 45 E.H.R.R. 14 at [59]. 
25
 Article 8(2) ECHR states ‘There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right 
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national 
security, public safety or the economic wellbeing of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the 
protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.’ 
26
 UK Parliament, ‘What are the human rights implications of Brexit?’ (Joint Select Committee, September 15, 
2016) http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/joint-select/human-rights-
committee/news-parliament-2015/brexit-human-rights-launch-16-17/ [accessed November 3, 2016], 16. 
27
 Janneke Gerards, ‘The discrimination grounds of Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights’ 
[2013] Human Rights Law Review 99, 100. 
28
 ibid 102. 
29
 Aaron Baker, ‘Article 14 ECHR: a protector, not a prosecutor’ (2006) 69 Modern Law Review 714, 716. 
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strengthen the argument that the ECHR represents a strong source of protection for individuals 
affected by the UK’s withdrawal. 
 
The ECHR guarantees a free-standing right to non-discrimination. This is protected by Protocol 12. 
Under that Protocol, instead of non-discrimination being limited to the enjoyment of substantive 
Convention rights as guaranteed by art.14 ECHR, Protocol 12 embodies a general prohibition on 
discrimination that is independent and is not restricted in its scope (unlike art.14).
30
 Protocol 12 has 
not been ratified by the UK; the Government’s position being that its “potential application…is too 
wide”.31 With Brexit comes risks of discrimination and human rights violations. Protocol 12, if in 
force, would have been a reassurance that the process of Brexit would prioritise non-discrimination 
for all affected. British citizens in Member States that have ratified Protocol 12 will be protected if 
they are found to be discriminated against for whatever reason after withdrawal. The reluctance 
demonstrated by the UK Government towards even ratifying the Protocol is indicative of its general 
hesitant attitude towards European human rights protection. The lack of full commitment in this 
regard makes it even more crucial to emphasise the consequences of failing to protect such rights in 
light of withdrawal. 
 
In the absence of a free standing right to non-discrimination guaranteed by Protocol 12, arts 8 and 14 
ECHR will become essential safeguards, albeit that there will be circumstances of discrimination 
where the ECHR cannot provide protection. Some cases have demonstrated that questions regarding 
an individual’s citizenship and nationality can potentially engage both art.8 and art.14 ECHR.32 These 
cases provide further evidence that the scope of private and family life under art.8 ECHR is a broad 
concept, certainly broader than when interpreted by the CJEU. The cases also broaden the scope of 
art.14 ECHR. An individual’s private life can be affected by questions concerning the individual’s 
                                                          
30
 Explanatory Report to the Protocol No. 12 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms 2000, 1. 
31
 UK Parliament, ‘Joint Committee on Human Rights – Seventeenth Report’ (Joint Committee on Human 
Rights, March 23, 2005) https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt200405/jtselect/jtrights/99/9902.htm   [accessed 
August 15, 2017] at [31]. 
32
 Genovese v Malta (App. No.53124/09), judgment of 11 October 2011; Ponomaryov v Bulgaria (App. 
No.5335/05), judgment of 21 June 2011. 
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access to nationality, as well as their access to education. The most relevant inference that can be 
drawn related to the Brexit scenario, therefore, is that if there was discrimination in a contracting 
state’s rules on nationality, this could amount to a breach of the ECHR. Should certain elements of the 
Brexit negotiations come to undermine an individual’s enjoyment of British citizenship,33 they may be 
challenged via arts 8 and 14 ECHR. At this point, it is important to acknowledge that the ECHR does 
not explicitly protect citizenship rights under art.8,
34
 so claimants must be cautious if relying on this. 
However, what the cases also indicate is a potentially broader scope of art.14 ECHR, which is 
relevant after withdrawal for affected individuals that are at risk of being discriminated. 
 
This article argues, therefore, that for a satisfactory regime of rights protection for relevant individuals 
post-Brexit to exist, arts 8 and 14 ECHR must be given full consideration and interpreted to their full 
potential. The agreement negotiated for citizens post-Brexit must account for the issues raised by 
ECHR case law regarding family separation and interruptions to private life, on the understanding that 
a failure to do so could amount to a breach of human rights.
35
 A potential defence, however, is 
whether protection deriving from the ECHR is already afforded to individuals in national law, given 
that UK national law is already expected to be in line with the obligations under the Convention. The 
objective of the UK’s Human Rights Act 1998 was to incorporate the ECHR into domestic law. 
Therefore, arguably, some level of this protection should already be in place.
36
 However, to date the 
UK’s rules on immigration that have had to comply with art.8 ECHR through the Human Rights Act 
1998 apply only to individuals who themselves fall outside the scope of EU law, namely non-EU 
nationals. To mitigate any negative effects of withdrawal on EU citizens, there still needs to be a 
                                                          
33
 It is worth noting that Genovese v Malta has been applied domestically by the UK Supreme Court in R 
(Johnson) v Secretary of State [2016] UKSC 56. 
34
 Fabien Marchadier, “L’attribution de la nationalité à l'épreuve de la Convention européenne des droits de 
l’homme: Réflexions à partir de l’arrêt Genovese c/ Malte,” (2012) 101 Revue critique de droit international 
privé 61, 68. 
35
 Furthermore, the scope of the Charter is being limited more and more in cases especially concerning 
citizenship and welfare benefits these days. See Adrienne Yong, ‘Driving a wedge between friends? The Court 
of Justice of the EU and its citizens in the case of welfare benefits’ (2016) 6 E.H.R.L.R.  664. 
36
 Michael Dougan et al, ‘Written evidence from Liverpool Law School, University of Liverpool (HRB0033)’ 
(Joint Committee on Human Rights, October 19, 2016) 
http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/joint-select/human-rights-
committee/inquiries/parliament-2015/human-rights-brexit-16-17/publications/ [accessed November 4, 2016] 
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clearer indication of the governing regime of rights protection after the withdrawal is complete – 
especially when there is still so little clarity in the current offer. 
 
The debate surrounding the human rights implications of Brexit has been raised in the context of the 
withdrawal negotiations, and the argument for protecting human rights in this context has garnered a 
significant amount of support.
37
 In November 2016, for instance, the Joint Committee on Human 
Rights accepted evidence for its inquiry entitled “What are the human rights implications of Brexit?” 
where it asked specifically for opinions on various issues regarding the right to a private and family 
life under art.8 ECHR.
38
 In February 2017, MPs voted to pass the European Union (Notification of 
Withdrawal) Act 2017 that allowed art.50 TEU to be triggered. The Act, however, did not include any 
guarantee for EU citizens’ rights. This was despite the House of Lords voting in favour of an 
amendment to the preceding Bill that included a guarantee for citizens’ rights, which was later 
rejected when the Bill returned to the House of Commons. 
 
The saga concerning the rights of EU citizens after Brexit continues to this day. The political turmoil 
that has occurred since the referendum vote in favour of Brexit has added to the uncertainty, 
particularly regarding the constantly changing face of Brexit itself.
39
 There is a great divergence in 
opinion as to what will be retained in terms of EU law after withdrawal, what should be retained after 
                                                          
37
 See Keir Starmer, ‘Roosevelt’s Legacy: Human Rights after Brexit’ [2017](2) European Human Rights Law 
Review 103; Michael Dougan et al, ‘Written evidence from Liverpool Law School, University of Liverpool 
(HRB0033)’; Tobias Lock, ‘Written evidence from Dr Tobias Lock (HRB0015)’ (Joint Committee on Human 
Rights, October 19, 2016) http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/joint-select/human-
rights-committee/inquiries/parliament-2015/human-rights-brexit-16-17/publications/ [accessed November 4, 
2016]; ‘Written evidence submitted by the Human Rights Centre, University of Essex (HRB0034)’ (Joint 
Committee on Human Rights, October 19, 2016) http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-
z/joint-select/human-rights-committee/inquiries/parliament-2015/human-rights-brexit-16-17/publications/ 
[accessed November 4, 2016]; Nicola Countouris et al, ‘Written evidence from Professor Nicola Countouris, 
Professor Piet Eeckhout, Professor Jeff King, Dr Virginia Mantouvalou, Dr Ronan McCrea and Professor Colm 
O’Cinneide1 (HRB0025)’ (Joint Committee on Human Rights, October 19, 2016)  
http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/joint-select/human-rights-
committee/inquiries/parliament-2015/human-rights-brexit-16-17/publications/ [accessed October 20, 2016]. 
38
 Joint Committee Report. 
39
 In particular, the discussions about remaining the Single Market and EU citizens’ rights have dominated 
headlines of late. See Heather Stewart, ‘Brexit: Labour threatens to defeat Theresa May over 'great repeal bill'’ 
(July 13, 2017) The Guardian https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/jul/12/labour-tories-great-repeal-bill-
brexit-eu [accessed July 17, 2017]; Jack Maidment, ‘Key Jeremy Corbyn ally claims UK could remain in single 
market after Brexit’ (July 16, 2017) The Telegraph http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/07/16/key-jeremy-
corbyn-ally-claims-uk-could-remain-single-market/ [accessed July 17, 2017]. 
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withdrawal and how to do so. Therefore, to further demonstrate that human rights are being 
undermined in the wake of Brexit, the next section of this article argues in favour of the retention of 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights in UK law. The UK Government, now without a majority in the 
House of Commons, has published its White Paper on the regime governing EU citizens’ rights after 
Brexit, and its plans for incorporating certain EU laws into UK law upon exit.  Despite Labour and the 
Liberal Democrats opposing a refusal to incorporate the Charter into UK law, the recently published 
EU (Withdrawal) Bill still purports to exclude it. There are pressing reasons to reconsider this before 
the Bill become law. 
 
3 Implications for the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
Human rights protection did not form part of the original intentions behind the creation of what is 
now the European Union. However, despite this, over time the Court of Justice of the EU has found 
ways to guarantee, and later develop the legal effectiveness of human rights in the EU’s legal order. 
Initially, this was achieved through the Court acknowledging that human rights were a general 
principle of EU law,
40
 interpreting and applying these rights in various cases.
41
 After some time, 
human rights were enshrined in a codified (and later, binding) document, known as the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights.
42
 When the Charter was first “solemnly proclaimed”,43 it was the first time the 
EU had a single consolidated catalogue of the full list of its recognised fundamental rights. The 
intention was that it would help fundamental rights become “more visible to the Union’s citizens”.44 
Following the enactment of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the Charter was eventually granted legal status 
in EU law equal to the EU Treaties themselves. The practical effect of this was that human rights 
                                                          
40
 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft (C-11/70) [1970] ECR I-1125. 
41
 Stauder v. Ulm (C-29/69) [1969] ECR I-0419; Wachauf (C-5/88) [1989] ECR I-2609; ERT (C-260/89) [1991] 
ECR I-02925. 
42
 Article 6 TEU. 
43
 Sarah Sy, ‘The Charter of Fundamental Rights’ (European Parliament, December 2016) 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_1.1.6.html [accessed April 10, 
2017]. 
44
 Cologne European Council, ‘Conclusions of the Presidency’ (European Parliament, June 1999) 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/kol1_en.htm [accessed April 10, 2017]. 
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protection under the Charter now “extended beyond the level guaranteed by the Convention.”45 The 
ECHR rights were also entrenched in the Charter, which has helped ensure consistency between the 
two human rights regimes. 
 
It is relevant at this point to highlight the role of the Council of Europe’s Social Charter of 1961 and 
its revised version of 1996. This instrument is described as “the regional counterpart” to the ECHR, 
which enshrined civil and political rights.
46
 The European Social Charter encompasses economic and 
social rights instead, similar to the Charter of Fundamental Rights. It was therefore a natural source of 
inspiration during the Charter’s drafting process. The revised European Social Charter is mostly 
replicated in the Charter of Fundamental Rights. However, the enforcement of the European Social 
Charter is troubled by an “á la carte approach for the definition of the commitments of States 
parties”47 which led to a lack of uniformity across Member States as to human rights protection. It is 
this weakness of the European Social Charter that has allowed the Charter of Fundamental Rights to 
become the main source of fundamental rights in Europe. Its failings also highlight the importance of 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The European Social Charter will not provide a satisfactory 
mechanism of enforcement for human rights protection if the Charter is no longer binding after 
withdrawal. This is despite it encompassing the same rights as the Charter. 
 
When analysing the practical effects of the Charter and its enforcement, it is important to remember 
that the CJEU is not a human rights court,
48
 and this has long been the case.
49
 For this reason, some 
argued that the value of the Charter would be limited, especially in respect of attempts to reconcile 
                                                          
45
 Juliane Kokott and Christoph Sobotta, ‘The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union after 
Lisbon’ [2010] EUI Working Papers, Academy of European Law 2010/6, 4.  
46
 DJ Harris, ‘A Fresh Impetus for the European Social Charter’ (1992) 41 ICLQ 659. 
47
 Olivier De Schutter, ‘The European Social Charter in the context of implementation of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights’ (European Parliament, 2016) p.43. 
48
 See Piet Eeckhout, ‘The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Federal Question’ (2002) 39 Common 
Market Law Review 945; Armin Von Bogdandy and others, ‘Reverse Solange - Protecting the Essence of 
Fundamental Rights against EU Member States’ (2012) 49 Common Market Law Review 489; Philip Alston and 
Joseph Weiler, ‘An "Ever Closer Union" in Need of a Human Rights Policy: the European Union and Human 
Rights’ in Philip Alston (ed), The EU and Human Rights (OUP: Oxford 1999); Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, ‘The 
European Union and Human Rights after the Treaty of Lisbon’ (2011) 11 Human Rights Law Review 645; 
Zambrano, Opinion of AG Sharpston at [155]. 
49
 There is an argument to be made that this will always be the case, and the development and discussion in this 
article supports the notion that the direction points towards this. 
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application and enforcement of the Charter with that of the ECHR through the Court of Human 
Rights.
50
 Since the Charter’s proclamation, however, a more constitutionalised fundamental rights 
rhetoric has spread throughout the EU institutions, culminating in the Charter being granted binding 
status. Since then, support has increased for the Charter as a source of human rights protection as the 
European Social Charter faded into the background. As Douglas-Scott points out, the Charter “may 
set higher standards than in the ECHR” and “legislation to disapply the Charter is surely an extreme 
measure”.51 The fact that the UK Government do not intend to incorporate the Charter into national 
law after Brexit is unwelcome, primarily because this would potentially do away with a higher level 
of rights protection for individuals than is offered by the ECHR and European Social Charter. It 
would turn back the clock on human rights protection in the UK and add significant work for the UK 
Government on top of its already heavily complicated procedure of withdrawal. The examples below 
demonstrate this. 
 
Although the enforcement of ECHR rights via the European Court of Human Rights will still exist 
after Brexit, one significant concern is the fact that there are fewer stringent obligations outside the 
framework of EU law to protect the various human rights that are currently recognised in the UK’s 
legal order.
52
 Rights protection and enforcement, as alluded to above, are much stronger under the 
Charter than the ECHR. Attitudes towards the European Social Charter have also been ambivalent, 
likely because of its inconsistent enforcement and application across Member States.
53
 This has 
diminished its value as a source of human rights protection. In this vein, one of the key problems at 
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present is the jurisdictional issues surrounding questions of EU citizens in the UK.
54
 The regime of 
human rights protection would be significantly weakened if the UK government does not wish to be 
bound by the CJEU after Brexit even in the matter of the EU citizens. This is made worse by the 
Charter losing binding status in the UK as per the plans in the EU (Withdrawal) Bill. Therefore, to 
assess why this refusal to adopt the Charter as UK law is so concerning, we need only to consider 
what the Charter has historically achieved for individuals, both EU citizens and UK nationals, and 
where it specifically offers a higher level of protection of rights compared to the mechanisms from the 
Council of Europe. 
 
In recent years, certain European Social Charter rights and sui generis rights in EU law have found 
their home in the Charter because they are without equivalent provisions in the ECHR. This disparity 
between the two regimes has been explicitly recognised by the Court of Justice of the EU in its case 
law,
55
 and led to various judgments that affirm the protection of these EU-specific rights. The 
provisions of the Charter provide a legal foundation for such protection especially given its binding 
nature. In order to highlight the positive impact of the Charter and the high level of protection it 
affords certain individuals, this section will consider the rights to data protection, rights to protection 
from discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation, and the rights to conduct a business and to 
property as examples of the wider range of rights not protected explicitly by the ECHR. This will 
highlight that without the Charter, the UK risks undoing a substantial portion of work that has been 
done to establish a high level of rights protection within its jurisdiction. 
 
One right that has become increasingly relevant in today’s technological age is the right to data 
protection enshrined in art.8 of the Charter. Data protection is a field of law in which it has been 
recognised that individuals have needed protection for some time.
56
 However, traditionally, data 
protection as a concept has been expressed narrowly under art.8 ECHR as a manifestation, or subset, 
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of the right to privacy.
57
 Previously considered an “unchartered” right,58 the recent judgments in 
Google Spain and Digital Rights Ireland saw the Court finally recognising the existence of an 
independent right to data protection that had to be enforced.
59
 At this point it is worth noting that the 
UK is not devoid of its own data protection mechanisms, many have been directly transposed from 
EU law.
60
 However, the Charter’s recognition of data protection as a fundamental right is unique, and 
offers a more robust level of protection than any domestic legislation. This, of course, would be lost if 
the Charter was not incorporated to the UK’s domestic legal order after Brexit, a move which could 
necessitate a return to applying outdated interpretations of the right to privacy in data protection cases. 
In an age where the law is already struggling to keep pace with technological advances, it would 
surely be a retrograde step for the UK to effectively erase the right to data protection under the 
Charter, as to do so would surely be to take considerable steps backwards in an area that has recently 
enjoyed many positive developments.
61
 
 
Secondly, the right to non-discrimination under art.21 of the Charter lists several protected 
characteristics, including an explicit reference to sexual orientation. This has been heralded by the 
LGBT community as one of the most explicit forms of protection for their rights, as Cooper notes that 
“[i]f the CFR [Charter of Fundamental Rights] is not to be included in the UK legal arrangements 
post exiting the EU, gay and lesbian people will be real losers.”62 Therefore, in the UK 
Government’s guarantee that the removal of the Charter will not affect the same substantive 
domestic rights, it seems to have overlooked the fact that there is not an equivalent right in the 
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UK protecting individuals from discrimination in respect of their sexual orientation. Cooper also 
notes the ECHR is weaker than the Charter, especially evident in the context of LGBT asylum 
case law. This has been notable in the discord between the European Court of Human Rights and 
the CJEU on the issue of whether having to conceal one’s sexual orientation for any amount of 
time is acceptable.63 In the absence of any specific reference to sexual orientation in the ECHR, 
the European Court of Human Rights must undertake a more generalised assessment of any 
potential breaches to rights pertaining to sexual orientation. Furthermore, the margin of 
appreciation granted to contracting States has been applied broadly in a number of cases where 
the applicant’s sexual orientation is of central importance,64 limiting the effectiveness of rights in 
this regard. The protection offered by the ECHR is simply not as effective as that provided by the 
Charter. 
 
Article 21 of the Charter, in the context of EU law, is a free standing guarantee of non-discrimination. 
As already discussed, Protocol 12 ECHR also provides a general right to non-discrimination but 
Protocol 12 has not been ratified by the UK (or made part of the Human Rights Act). In the absence 
of Protocol 12, the loss of art.21 CFR is significant. This is not only because of the abovementioned 
value of the Charter’s specific right to protection from discrimination on the basis of  sexual 
orientation, but losing the Charter means that the void created by the UK’s decision not to ratify 
Protocol 12 ECHR will re-emerge. In this regard, the Charter has played a crucial role in protecting 
equality.
65
 Without the Charter, the right to non-discrimination will be significantly diluted. If the 
Charter is not to remain part of UK law, the Government can remedy this loss of essential human 
rights protection by ratifying Protocol 12 ECHR and incorporating it into domestic law. 
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Finally, art.16 of the Charter expressly protects the right to conduct a business, and art.17 protects the 
right to property. The inclusion of these economically motivated provisions was the source of some 
discontent in the Charter’s early days, as it seemed that by including these rights the EU did not 
entirely understand the true nature of fundamental human rights.
66
 Allowing the Charter to include 
rights linked directly to the protection offered under the four fundamental freedoms of movement 
risked distracting from the fact that Charter was supposed to codify to social and political rights. 
However, it was soon clarified in the case of Deutsches Weintor that this was not the intention of 
these particular provisions, and that instead there was a need to balance competing rights and interests 
including social and political rights.
67
 Nonetheless, the inclusion of this category of rights in the 
Charter is unique to the EU, with no direct equivalent in the ECHR,
68
 and is another example of an 
area of specific rights that the UK would need to consider as part of its domestic legal regime post-
withdrawal. At this point it is worth noting the fact that the Charter is the result of a significant 
amount of work undertaken to create a clear catalogue of rights the EU considered fundamental, and 
the UK, were it to seek to reaffirm some of the rights contained within the Charter post-withdrawal, 
would have to go through this lengthy process again if it were to exclude the Charter from national 
law. Undertaking such a task would be unnecessarily arduous, and something the UK Government 
would do well to avoid. 
 
The CJEU has evidently pushed boundaries in its application of the Charter to create a strong level of 
protection for rights. As a result, the protection of these rights is stronger through the enforcement of 
the Charter than by other means. This has been achieved through a generous interpretation of the 
Charter’s scope, and on occasion, it has been applied to matters that would otherwise seemingly fall 
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outside its remit. The Fransson case confirmed that the interpretation of art.51 of the Charter 
regarding scope was a broad assessment, and that: 
“[I]f such legislation falls within the scope of European Union law, the Court, when requested 
to give a preliminary ruling, must provide all the guidance as to interpretation needed in order 
for the national court to determine whether that legislation is compatible with the fundamental 
rights the observance of which the Court ensures.”69 
Initially, this implied that the Charter should and could be taken seriously as an instrument that 
justified bringing human rights protection to the forefront of enforcement. Over the years, however, 
the Court seems to have narrowed this view, and now “the prospect of an activist ECJ pushing for a 
broader competence for fundamental rights is rather slim.”70 However, the Charter is still clearly of 
significance despite recent narrowing of scope. 
 
Unfortunately, the damage done to EU human rights protection by the Bill is not limited to the 
exclusion of the Charter. Schedule 1, paragraph 3(1) of the Bill makes the Charter’s exclusion from 
domestic law after Brexit even more undesirable. It states ‘[t]here is no right of action in domestic law 
on or after exit day based on a failure to comply with any of the general principles of EU law.’71 
Schedule 1, paragraph 4 also states that ‘[t]here is no right in domestic law on or after exit day to 
damages in accordance with the rule in Francovich.’72 This schedule is an attempt by the UK 
Government to further restrict the reach of fundamental rights protection in the EU, for it limits any 
independent rights of actions for breaches of general principles of EU law like fundamental rights, 
and removes the ability to sue for such breaches of EU law.
73
 Prior to the Charter’s existence, 
bringing a claim for a breach of general principles of EU law were how EU fundamental rights were 
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previously enforced by the CJEU.
74
 By removing the Charter with its own independent right of action 
as well as the right of action for breaches of general principles of EU law, it seems that very little 
enforcement or recourse to EU fundamental rights will be available post-Brexit. This is profoundly 
concerning and demonstrates a hostility on the part of the UK Government to the importance and 
value of EU fundamental rights. The process of Brexit will be like a tsunami. There will be 
unexpected outcomes. It is at these times of upheaval and transition that effective and enforceable 
human rights are essential. If the Government wants the process of Brexit to have a minimum impact 
on everyday life in the UK, the Government should be maximising human rights protection. Instead, 
they are proposing to minimise it. Human rights guarantee protection during periods of transition and 
they mitigate the impact of change, seeking to ensure change does not become a crisis.    
 
Removing the right to claim breaches of EU fundamental rights as a general principle of EU law and 
the ability to sue for breaches of EU law will limit rights even further than just removing the Charter 
will. The Charter has of late become the main source of fundamental rights because of the Lisbon 
Treaty granting it binding status, but prior to its existence, fundamental rights were enforced as 
general principles of EU law. The violation of a fundamental principle of EU law constitutes grounds 
for a cause of action in EU law.
75
 Without the Charter, it would have been expected that EU 
fundamental rights protection as a general principle could be relied upon, especially as these rights 
already find expression in many other provisions of EU law. Such rights are also enforced through 
domestic legislation that derived from relevant EU law. However, in some situations, EU law has 
been preferred over domestic UK law to best protect fundamental rights, sometimes even setting UK 
law aside.
76
 Alongside this as a remedy are Francovich damages, financial compensation from the 
State for serious breaches of EU law. However, schedule 1 will now require that any EU fundamental 
rights are only enforced if they can be found in domestic legislation, EU law can no longer set aside 
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UK law and there will no longer be recourse to damages for serious breaches of EU law by the State. 
This will severely limit individual rights protection in an uncertain transitionary period where these 
rights will be at most risk and where remedies for violations of human rights by State will be most 
needed. Without this and without the Charter, situations where fundamental rights will be available 
post-Brexit will be few and far between. 
 
If the UK excludes the Charter and the jurisdiction of the CJEU after Brexit, there are likely to be 
serious consequences affecting the protection of fundamental rights, whether they are human rights 
protected by the ECHR or otherwise. This bears the greatest risks for EU citizens in the UK and their 
families. In this regard, it is clear that there are not only legal reasons for why the Charter should be 
retained post-Brexit, but also strong underlying reasons related to policy. The fact that the UK 
Government still seeks to exclude the Charter even after the political disquiet expressed in opposition 
of such a choice indicates how urgent the need is to improve awareness of the risks of failing to 
adequate address such imminent consequences for fundamental rights protection. 
 
4 Conclusion 
It is difficult to predict what the future holds for the EU and the UK. This article has highlighted some 
human rights implications of Brexit, emphasised that the ECHR is still available as a source from 
which individuals can claim rights, and has argued that the Charter should not be sacrificed as part of 
the process of withdrawal. Although there are likely to be teething problems as solutions to these 
complicated problems are negotiated, for now, the UK Government seems to have failed to 
meaningfully engage with an issue that is supposedly a top priority – human rights protection. It may 
be unwise for this to continue. The debate is still ongoing and as negotiations crystallise the future for 
human rights protection will become clearer. At present, however, it is evident that not only are 
human rights being set aside, but that they should not be. If these issues are not meaningfully engaged 
with soon, great difficulties will lie ahead for EU citizens in the UK and British citizens in the EU. 
